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Procedure-Service of Process-urisdiction for in Personam Judgment Obtained
by Service on Resident outside State-[Federal].-The plaintiff instituted a suit in a
Colorado state court to obtain equitable relief from a personal judgment of a Wyoming
court against the plaintiff's testate, alleging that the Wyoming court had lacked per-
sonal jurisdiction and that there was a conflict between the findings and the decree.
In the former action the plaintiff's testate, a Wyoming resident, was personally served
in Colorado in accordance with the Wyoming statute permitting personal service out of
the state where the resident defendant has left the state to avoid service or to defraud
creditors.' The Colorado district court dismissed the plaintiff's bill, finding that the
Wyoming statutes regarding service were constitutional and that since the Wyoming
court had had jurisdiction its judgment was valid. The Colorado Supreme Court re-
versed on the ground that there was an irreconcilable conflict between the findings and
the decree, but it did not decide the question of the Wyoming court's jurisdiction over
the defendant, the plaintiff's testate.2 On review by certiorari the United States Su-
preme Court held, that the Wyoming provision for personal service out of state met
all the requirements of due process, since domicile is sufficient to afford jurisdiction for
purposes of a personal judgment over an absent resident served by appropriate sub-
stituted service; that the Wyoming court having had jurisdiction, the Colorado holding
that the Wyoming judgment was void for inconsistency was not warranted. Judgment
of the Colorado Supreme Court reversed. Milliken v. Meyer.3
The principal case settles a question long doubtful, inasmuch as the rather few cases
directly in point are in conflict.4 This previous diversity of opinion is difficult to ex-
plain in view of the well-settled requirements of due process in regard to service. The
Federal Constitution does not prescribe certain methods the states must employ;s due
x Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1931) §§ 89--817(6) and 89-822.
2o' Colo. 564, 76 P. (2d) 420 (1937); 105 Colo. 532, 1oo P. (2d) i5 (I940).
3 6I S. Ct. 339 (i94o).
4 Cases in accord with the holding in the principal case: In re Hendrickson, 40 S.D. 211,
167 N.W. 172 (x918); Becker v. Becker, 218 S.W. 542 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); Northern Alumi-
num Co. v.Law, 157 Md. 641, 147 At. 715 (1929). Contra: Raher v. Raher, i5o Iowa 511,
129 N.W. 494 (19I1); Moss v. Fitch, 212 Mo. 484, III S.W. 475 (19o8); Smith v. Grady, 68
Wis. 215, 31 N.W. 477 (1887); de la Montanya v. de la Montanya, X12 Cal. io, 44 Pac. 345
(i896). In the de la Montanya case the majority opinion mentions only service by publication,
but the minority opinion states that copies of the complaint and summons were sent to
France where the defendant was staying. Service outside the state upon a non-resident has
uniformly been held insufficient. Wilson v. Seligman, 144 U.S. 41 (x892); Scott v. Streepy,
73 Tex. 547, i S.W. 532 (x889); Denny v. Ashley, 12 Colo. i65, 20 Pac. 331 (1889); McEwan
v. Zimmer, 38 Mich. 765 (1878). In Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U.S. 476 (1878), the defendant re-
sided on an Indian plantation and thus could not be considered a resident of the Territory of
Idaho. In at least one case denying the validity of such service it does not appear whether
the defendant was a resident or a non-resident. Bischoff v. Wethered, 9 Wall. (U.S.) 812
(i869); cf. Rand v. Hanson, 154 Mass. 87, 28 N.E. 6 (i89i) (no affirmative showing that
service on a non-resident was had within the state); Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. Peter-
son, 41 Neb. 897, 6o N.W. 373 (1894) (statute permitting service outside the state only in in
rem proceedings); Dunn v. Dunn, 4 Paige (N.Y.) 425 (1834) (personal service of subpoena
outside state on resident defendant in divorce case held irregular).
5 See Honeyman v. Hanan, 302 U.S. 375, 378 (1937); Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. I3, 24
(1928).
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process requires only that the procedure adopted afford the defendant reasonable no-
tice and a fair opportunity to be heard before the issues are decided.6 If personal serv-
ice is not practicable the substitute method employed must be that most likely to reach
the defendant.7 It has been uniformly held that when personal service cannot be had
on a resident defendant, leaving a copy of the summons at his usual place of abode con-
stitutes due process, even though the defendant be outside the state at the time.8
Clearly in some cases the defendant will be unaware of the institution of proceedings
against him despite such service. On the other hand there is no possibility of his not
knowing of the suit if he is personally served outside the state. And other methods
likewise less likely to give the defendant actual notice have been upheld: the practice
of mailing the summons to the defendant's address,9 and that of appointing a curator
ad hoc.1o There are even indications that publication is sufficient in the case of a resi-
dent temporarily absent from the state, particularly if he has absented himself for
the purpose of avoiding service." Apart from the question of due process, it certainly
seems more fair to the defendant that he be sued in the state of his domicile rather than
in some other jurisdiction in which he happens to be temporarily.
The main obstacles to the acceptance of the position taken in the principal case have
been twofold: dicta such as in Pennoyer v. Neff,12 and the notion that jurisdiction is
6 See Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U.S. 261, 265 (1912).
7 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 , 92 (1917).
s Continental Nat'l Bank v. Thurber, 74 Hun (N.Y.) 632, 26 N.E. 956 (1893); Harryman
and Schryver v. Roberts, 52 Md. 64 (1879); Huntley v. Baker, 33 Hun (N.Y.) 578 (1884);
Hurlbut v. Thomas, 55 Conn. r81, io Atl. 556 (1887); Sturgis v. Fay, 16 Ind. 429 (i86i).
In the last three cases the defendants were outside the state. But cf. Amsbaugh v. Exchange
Bank, 33 Kan. ioo, 5 Pac. 384 (1885) (defendant had left state intending never to return);
Settlemier v. Sullivan, 97 U.S. 444 (1878) (officer's return failed to state affirmatively that the
defendant was not to be found). This form of service was impliedly upheld in McDonald v.
Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917).
9Bickerdike v. Allen, 157 Il. 95, 4x N.E. 74o (i895) (service by publication and mailing in
revival action); Nelson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 225 i. 197, 8o N.E. xo9 (igo6) (service on
domestic corporation by publication and mailing where officers and agents could not be found).
o Ory v. Bosio, 178 La. 221, IS So. 187 (1933); Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N.Y. 217 (,878) (involv-
ing a divorce judgment treated as in personam).
1" Fernandez v. Casey & Swasey, 77 Tex. 452, 14 S.W. 149 (i8go); Stockwell v. McCrack-
en, 1o9 Mass. 84 (187) (joint debtors); Glover v. Glover, i8 Ala. 367 (x85o) (defendant had
left state apparently for the purpose of avoiding service). The defendant in Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714 (1877), was a non-resident, and in McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (9,7), the
defendant had left the state intending to establish a domicile elsewhere. Cf. Frothingham v.
Barnes, 9 R.I. 474 (1870); Henderson v. Staniford, io5 Mass. 504 (1870).
" "The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the
State in which it is established. Any attempt to exercise authority beyond those limits would
be deemed illegitimate assumption of power, and be resisted as mere abuse." "Process from the
tribunals of one State cannot run into another State, and summon parties there domiciled to
leave its territory and respond to proceedings against them." Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,
720, 727 (1877). A careful reading of the opinion seems to make clear, however, that the
Court is discussing the case of a non-resident only. See also Denny v. Ashley, 12 Colo. 165, 20
Pac. 331 (1889).
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based upon physical power over the body of the defendant.'3 A familiar dictum is that
the defendant, to be subject to personal jurisdiction, must be served by process within
the state or must make a voluntary appearance. 4 But the cases have dealt with non-
residents, and the distinction between residents and non-residents, while often left
implicit, has been a decisive factor in the actual decisions.'s Unless so restricted, the
statement is not accurate, for the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the need for
substituted service. 6
The physical power theory of jurisdiction, although enunciated by Mr. Justice
Holmes,'7 is not an adequate explanation of a court's power. Jurisdiction obtained by
leaving a copy of the summons at the defendant's usual place of abode and the various
instances of jurisdiction by consent" indicate a trend away from the physical power
theory. Furthermore, domicile has been held a sufficient basis for taxation, since a resi-
dent is under an obligation, in return for the privileges and benefits he receives, to share
in the costs of government. 9 The courts thus appear to have worked out a partial the-
ory of domiciliary allegiance. 2" In view of this tendency it is surprising that the decision
in Blackner v. United States" was not accepted as settling the question presented in
'1 See Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346, 353 (x913); McDonald v. Mabee, 243
U.S. 9o, 91 (1917).
'4 SeeHarknessv. Hyde, 98 U.S. 476, 478 (1878); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 721 (,877).
1S See notes 4,8, and ii supra. See Knowles v. The Gaslight and Coke Co., ig Wall. (U.S.)
58, 61-62 (1873).
16See Knowles v. The Gaslight and Coke Co., i9 Wall. (U.S.) 58, 61-62 (1873); Jacob v.
Roberts, 223 U.S. 261, 265 (1912).
'7 Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346, 353 (I913), and McDonald v. Mabee,
243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
is See Dodd, Jurisdiction in Personal Actions, 23 Ill. L. Rev. 427, 428-34 (1929). Cf.
Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, i8 How. (U.S.) 404 (1855); Copin v. Adamson, 9 L.R. Ex. 345
(,874).
'9 New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937); Lawrence v. State Tax Com'n,
286 U.S. 276 (1932).
" See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932); Lawrence v. State Tax Com'n,
286 U.S. 276, 279 (1932); Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U.S. 287,
297-98 (i89o); Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N.Y. 217, 239 (x878). Cf. the suggestion in Schibsby v.
Westenholz, 6 L. R. Q. B. i55, i61 (1870), to the effect that if the defendants had been citizens
or residents of the country whose judgment is sought to be enforced against them they would
have owed allegiance to that country and would have been bound by its laws concerning sub-
stituted service.
X2 84 U.S. 42X (1932). Both Beale and Cheshire insist upon distinguishing between the con-
ceptions of nationality and of domicile. Admittedly these must be kept separate for some pur-
poses, for a person may change his nationality without altering his domicile and vice versa.
The distinction seems especially necessary in a federal system of government. The ties of
domicile may in certain instances be closer than those of citizenship, for while an American
citizen may reside abroad and have relatively little contact with his native land (apparently as
in the Blackmer case), there can be no such thing as a citizen (that is, a resident) of an American
state with a domicile elsewhere. But the jurisdiction of the state of a person's domicile would
appear to apply to him only while he is within the borders of the federal system of which his
state is a part. Smith v. Grady, 68 Wis. 215, 31 N.W. 477 (1887); Grubel v. Nassauer, 210
N.Y. 149, 103 N.E. 1113 (i913). Here judgments by foreign courts against their nationals
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the principal case. There an American citizen was subpoenaed in France, being ordered
to appear as a witness in a criminal trial in the United States. The Supreme Court held
that since the United States has jurisdiction over an absent citizen, such a citizen, if
given adequate notice, might be punished for contempt for failure to appear.
In what is perhaps the leading case contrary to the holding of the principal case,
Raker v. Raer'22 the fundamental objection voiced by the majority seems to be that
the serving of process took place in another state, rather than that the defendant
served was in the other state; if the latter were the objection, service by leaving a copy
of the summons at the defendant's usual place of abode would be ineffectual if the de-
fendant happened to be out of the state. Since notice personally served in a foreign
state in an in rem proceeding 2 or a divorce action 24 has some effect (to notify the de-
fendant, for the court already has jurisdiction), it is difficult to understand how the
same extraterritorial action may be considered a nullity merely because the proceeding
is in personam. Nor can it be argued that personal service within another jurisdiction
is an invasion of any right of the other government, for this contention was expressly
rejected in the Blackmer case.2s While admitting a theoretical difference between the
allegiance of a national and that of a domiciliary, the very fact that this distinction
has been obscured in some cases indicates that the obligations involved are essentially
the same.
26
This notion of domiciliary obligation seems less unfamiliar if thought of in terms of
implied consent. The only difference then between the consent of a resident and that
of a foreign motorist, 27 for example, is one of scope; the privileges granted the resident
are greater and consequently his consent to the jurisdiction of the state courts is not
limited.
The decision in the principal case is entirely in keeping with present-day needs. If,
as has been suggested, 8 the physical power theory has its origin in the early develop-
in the United States were declared void, perhaps, as Beale suggests, because the foreign courts
involved were courts of constituent states within federal systems, Ontario in one case and
Bavaria in the other. The same question would arise if an American state attempted to serve
process on an absent resident in a foreign country and not in a sister state as in the principal
case. See Cheshire, Private International Law 155-76 (2d ed. i938); i Beale, Conflict of
Laws, 1oo, 291, 344-45 ('935)-
- 15o Iowa 51I, 129 N.W. 494 (i91).
23 Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 (igoo).
'4 See White v. White, 65 N.J. Eq. 741, 55 AtI. 739 (1903); d. Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry,
228 U.S. 346 (I913) (notice given to executor outside state held sufficient since administration
of estate considered one proceeding). A domestic corporation may be subjected to an in per-
sonam judgment where an officer of the corporation is served outside the state. Bennett v.
Chicago Lumber & Coal Co. 201 Iowa 770, 208 N.W. 519 (1926); Straub v. Investment Co.,
31 S.D. 571, 141 N.W. 979 (1913).
2 SThis objection was expressed in de la Montanya v. de la Montanya, 112 Cal. 1o, iog,
44 Pac. 345, 346 (I896).
26 Cf. Northern Aluminum Co. v. Law, 157 Md. 64r, 147 Ad. 7,5 (1929); de Meli v. de
Meli, 12o N.Y. 485, 24 N.E. 996 (i8go).
'7 Cf. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
2 Beale, The Jurisdiction of Courts over Foreigners, 26 Harv. L. Rev. 283, 284 (I9r3).
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ment of the English monarch as a territorial sovereign in contrast to the continental
feudal kings, its historical justification no longer exists. The increasingly artificial na-
ture of state boundaries, the spreading of metropolitan areas into two or more states,
and the ever more universal and rapid methods of transportation all demand a modem
approach to the problem of process.
Receivers-Priorities-Wage Claims Preferred over Debts Due the United States
-[Missouri].--In a Missouri state court receivership proceeding,' wage claimants
sought priority under a state statute.2 The Federal Housing Authority, as assignee of
a note of the debtor, claimed priority under Section 3466 of the Revised Statutes3
which gives priority to debts due the United States in cases, among others,4 "in which
a debtor .... makes a voluntary assignment .... [and] cases in which an act of bank-
ruptcy is committed." Held, that the wage claims should be paid before the claims of
the United States. The priority given the claims of the United States by Section 3466
is to be interpreted with reference to Section 64(a) of the National Bankruptcy Act, to
which Section 3466 is linked. Section 64 of the Bankruptcy Acts gives priority to wage
claims over debts due the United States; and a proper construction of Section 3466
requires that under it the claims of the United States be given only that priority which
is granted them in bankruptcy proceedings. Emory v. St. James Distillery, Inc. (United
States, Intervenor).6
The court's construction of Section 3466 is unsupported by precedent. In Kupshire
Coats, Inc. v. United States,7 the New York Court of Appeals held that Section 64 of
the Bankruptcy Act did not modify the apparent priority, under Section 3466, of
United States tax claims over wage claims; and in other situations the courts have
uniformly refused to construe the priority given under Section 3466 as being limited
by the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.8
Section 3466, however, does expressly apply in situations which are "acts of bank-
ruptcy." In order to determine the scope of that term in Section 3466 at any given
'The proceeding was instituted in accordance with the provisions of Mo. Stat. Ann. (1929)
§ 4960.
2 Mo. Stat. Ann. (1929) § 1168.
3 Rev. Stat. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C.A. § I91 (1927).
4 The other cases include insolvency, insufficiency of decedent's estate to meet all debts,
attachment of effects of absconding, concealed, or absent debtor by process of law.
s As amended, 52 Stat. 874 (1938), 1i U.S.C.A. § io4 (Supp. 194o).
6 143 S.W. (2d) 318 (Mo. App. 1940). 7 272 N.Y. 221, 5 N.E. (2d) 715 (1936).
8 In re Assignment of Simpson, Inc., 258 App. Div. 148, 15 N.Y.S. (2d) 1021 (1939) (United
States allowed tax penalties in assignment for benefit of creditor proceedings, while such
penalties not provable in bankruptcy proceedings); Spokane County v. United States, 279
U.S. 80 (1929); People of New York v. United States, io6 F. (2d) 210 (C.C.A. 3d 1939); In re
Lincoln Chair & Novelty Co., Inc., 274 N.Y. 353, 9 N.E. (2d) 7 (1937).
The court in the instant case does not explain its holding that the wage claims, in order to
be entitled to priority, must meet the requirements of both the state act and the Bankruptcy
Act. It may be urged that since the position of claims of the United States in the scale of
priorities is exclusively for Congressional determination, the presence or absence of a state
statute is of no significance.
